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IMPEACHMENT AS A TECHNIQUE OF
PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN A PRESIDENTIAL

SYSTEM?
LORI FISLER DAMROSCH*
INTRODUCTION
With the country's attention riveted on the Clinton
impeachment crisis, an essay on separation of powers in
foreign affairs must emphasize different themes from those
that might have been expected at any other time since the
Nixon resignation. In the intervening quarter century, there
has been little attention to the potential use-or misuse--of
impeachment as a technique for legislative control of
presidential actions involving war and foreign affairs. The
impeachment trial has turned received wisdom upside down;
now we must confront a deeper set of questions about whether
the United States model of presidentialism (as we have known
it for the last 130 or 210 years) is being discarded in favor of
something more like a parliamentary model, under which the
President's hold on his office is secure only for as long as he can
retain the confidence of the legislature.
Nowhere are those deeper constitutional questions more
pressing than in the field of foreign affairs. Although President
Clinton's troubles are "domestic" in the strict etymological
sense,' they interconnect with the most serious foreign policy
judgments of his presidency, as did those of President Nixon a
generation ago.
If the Watergate investigations began
domestically with the blunders of the 1972 Nixon reelection
campaign, they eventually encompassed the most divisive

* Professor of Law, Columbia University. The author acknowledges the
United States Institute of Peace and Columbia Law School's fund for faculty
summer research for supporting her research on comparative constitutionalism
and war powers. Thanks to Barbara Aronstein Black, Michael Doff, John Hart
Ely, Henry Monaghan, and Gerald Neuman, who read the draft and alerted the
author to her misdemeanors.
1. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 405 (3d ed. 1996)
("domestic... [ME.<OFr. domestique < L domesticus < domus: see DOME] 1. having
to do with the home or housekeeping; of the house or family").
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aspects of Nixon's foreign policy. In 1974, the House Judiciary
Committee considered, but ultimately did not adopt, an article
of impeachment concerning the secret bombing of Cambodia
between March 1969 and the summer of 1973.2 Clinton's
decision to order a bombardment of Iraq on the eve of his
impeachment by the House of Representatives, and the hardly
sympathetic reaction from the congressional majority, are
reminiscent of the unfortunate confluence of the Saturday
Night Massacre and the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in
October 1973.
The present crisis sends us back to first principles, to
reexamine in a wholly new light the fundamental problem of
the relationship 'between Congress and the President,
especially in foreign affairs but truly across the board. Are we
witnessing a transformation from what had hitherto been a
system of balanced powers into one in which a president could
be ejected from office (or at best severely crippled in the
exercise of the powers of the office) by something comparable to
a parliamentary vote of no confidence? If so, we would hardly
recognize the American model of separation of powers, and all
our previous thinking about presidential-congressional
interactions, in foreign affairs contexts as well as others, would
have to be reconceived.
Understanding the dynamics of legislative-executive
relations in different kinds of constitutional systems has been a
central focus of my recent research. In work-in-progress on
comparative constitutionalism and war powers, I am exploring
similarities and differences in the control of military activities
under parliamentary and presidential models of government:
how do different systems ensure civilian control of the military
and restrain the outbreak of unwise or unlawful wars? I am
finding an amazing richness of constitutional techniques, with
the question of parliamentary control of the executive branch
receiving different resolution or emphasis in light of the
historical and political factors affecting particular democratic
polities. Within the confines of the present essay, it will be
sufficient to identify Selected comparisons between the United

2. On the Cambodia matter in the Nixon impeachment hearings, see infra Part
III.A.
3. The national media publicly questioned President Nixon's motives in placing
United States forces on worldwide alert on that occasion.
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States presidential and British parliamentary systems, with
attention to the potential legislative removal of executive
leaders in relation to war and national security concerns.
In the American constitutional system, legislativeexecutive disputes over separation of powers in foreign affairs
typically entail divergent conceptions of the extent to which the
legislative branch is entitled to participate in foreign
policymaking before the die is cast, or whether Congress is
relegated to after-the-fact modes of control-most notably,
cutting off funds for executive policies of which Congress
disapproves. Along with the purse-string check, impeachment
is, at least theoretically, available as an ultimate form of post
hoc legislative control; indeed, some scholars assert that the
power of the purse and impeachment are the only methods that
the legislature should be able to use to constrain executive
military decisions.4 I incline toward the opposite perspective:
that major exercises of foreign affairs power-especially
decisions to initiate a substantial military conflict or create
significant international obligations-should entail some
measure of participation by the legislative branch before the
decision is irrevocable, rather than reliance on the blunter
instruments that are available only after the Executive has
made serious errors of judgment. Under this conception, which
I believe
is the best understanding of American
constitutionalism as applied to foreign affairs, Congress has
the right to request and receive adequate and timely
information bearing on foreign policy decisions and to be
involved in authorizing major external commitments.
Impeachment, as a drastic after-the-fact remedy, could
hardly foster the wisdom of major policy choices in the external
realm. Indeed, impeachment for trivial causes unrelated to the
great affairs of state, as we have seen in Clinton's case, could
inflict incalculable damage to the country's ability to forge and
carry out critical national security decisions. On the other
hand, impeachment may properly belong in the legislative
arsenal as a weapon of last resort against a president who has
seriously subverted the constitutional system so that Congress
cannot otherwise exercise its prerogatives of shared
participation in important national foreign policy judgments.

4. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuationof Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understandingof War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 295-96 (1996).
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The records of the 1787 Constitutional Convention
concerning impeachment confirm that the Framers rebuffed
George Mason's proposal to make the President impeachable
for "maladministration," because, as James Madison wrote,
"[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during
pleasure of the Senate."' Along with constitutional text and
original understanding, two centuries of constitutional
experience and the structural logic of American presidentialism
point toward an exceedingly high threshold for invoking
impeachment as a final safeguard against the most heinous
acts--ones presumably more egregious than bungling a foreign
relations matter or departing from the foreign policy
preferences of Congress.
Yet with the phrase "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors," the
Framers
evidently
signaled
certain
possibilities
for
impeachment relevant to the foreign relations of the United
States. It remains for us to explore what those possibilities
might be.
The central inquiry for this essay is the proper use of the
impeachment tool in foreign relations contexts, including war
powers. In Part I, the essay begins with a brief review of
British impeachment practice (limited to war and foreign policy
concerns) known to the Founding generation and reflected in
certain fundamental texts of the Founding; this treatment does
not betoken any originalist orientation on my part (au
contraire)but will set the context for later developments. Part
II then turns to the travails of President Andrew Johnson as
seen through the eyes of Walter Bagehot, the author of the
classic
treatment
of the
nineteenth-century
British
Constitution, which remains a cogent starting point for
comparisons between parliamentary and presidential systems,
including on the issue of removal of the head of government.
Finally, after an examination in Part III of aspects of the Nixon
impeachment crisis relevant to war and national security and a
brief look at why impeachment was not considered for the IranContra affair during the Reagan Administration, the essay
concludes with some comparative reflections on parliamentary
and presidential forms of governance and what such

5.

JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,

at 605 (Ohio University Press 1984) (1893) [hereinafter MADISON'S NOTES].
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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comparisons might portend for constitutional control of war
and foreign affairs.
I.

IMPEACHMENT IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH
CENTURIES

A.

BritishImpeachments Relevant to War and External
Affairs

In the century and a half before the Philadelphia
Convention, the British Parliament had impeached a number
of civil officers for abuses related to war and external relations.
These officers included the Earl of Strafford in 1640 for causes
that related to use of the military; the Earl of Clarendon in
1667 for reverses in the second Anglo-Dutch War; Peter Pett,
Commissioner of the Navy, in 1668 on charges including
negligent preparation for a Dutch invasion; the Earl of Danby
in 1679 for making an unauthorized offer to France of
neutrality in a war between France and Holland and for
arranging a clandestine payment from King Louis XIV of
France to King Charles II; and the Earl of Oxford, Viscount
Bolingbroke, and the Duke of Ormond in 1715 for their role in
the Treaty of Utrecht.7 Danby holds the distinction of having
been impeached a second time in 1695 on charges of taking a
bribe from the East India Company. In between the two
impeachments, he played a key role in the conspiracy to bring
about the 1688 invasion by William of Orange that overthrew
King James II, as well as in the maneuvering to persuade the
British Parliament to offer the throne to William and Mary.8

7. See ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER: THE ORIGINS 383 n.30 (1976) (citing, inter alia, T. PLUCKNETT, TASWELLLANGMEAD'S ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 529-38 (11th ed. 1960)); see also
STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D
CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 4-7 (Comm.

Print 1974); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 7-102
(1973); Clayton Roberts, The Law of Impeachment in Stuart England: A Reply to
Raoul Berger, 84 YALE L.J. 1419 (1975); Yoo, supra note 4, at 214 & nn.256-59.

Oxford's impeachment involved a charge of withholding information about treaty
negotiations from Parliament. See SOFAER, supra,at 9.
8. See 7 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPEDIA 239-40 (15th ed. 1998)
(citing ANDREW BROWNING, 3 THOMAS OSBORNE, EARL OF DANBY AND DUKE OF
LEEDS, 1632-1712 (1944-51)). The events surrounding Danby's 1679 impeachment
included the disclosure that he had arranged for a secret subsidy from King Louis
XIV of France to King Charles II, see id.; see also Yoo, supra note 4, at 214 n.247, an
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Some United States scholars with originalist inclinations
invoke British practices of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, such as the use of impeachment to control executive
military conduct, as a privileged source of evidence of
constitutional meaning.9 In this vein, they argue that the
United States Framers imported a view of separated powers
under which the Executive had exclusive war-initiating
authority, subject only to limited parliamentary control after
the fact through the power of the purse or impeachment of the
King's ministers.' ° As a method for discerning the overall
contours of United States executive-legislative allocation of
power (and wholly apart from the accuracy of treatment of the
British antecedents or the soundness of the claim that the
Framers implicitly adopted British impeachment practice),"
there are substantial reasons to reject the general mode of
argumentation from British eighteenth-century models, as
Justice Jackson did in his famous concurrence in Youngstown

episode to which Framer Gouverneur Morris alluded during the Convention's debate
on the Impeachment Clause. See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 5, at 335.
[N]o one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of
seeing the first Magistrate in forign pay, without being able to guard
agst. it by displacing him. One would think the King of England well
secured agst. bribery. He has as it were a fee simple in the whole
Kingdom. Yet Charles II was bribed by Louis XIV. The Executive ought
therefore to be impeachable for treachery .... When we make him
amenable to Justice however we should take care to provide some mode
that will not make him dependent on the Legislature.
Id.
9. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 196-217.
10. See id. at 198, 204, 210, 214, 217.
11. See W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? 3, 51-74 (1981) (finding

strong evidence in records from the Founding generation of Framers' intent that
"Congress is to control most American decisions about war and peace"). In regard to
the specifics of impeachment, although the Framers did borrow certain British
features including a bicameral procedure and the concept of "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors," in other respects they consciously departed from the British model,
including the consequences of impeachment. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7
(limiting effects of judgment of impeachment to "removal from Office and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the
United States," while preserving possibility of criminal prosecution in a separate
proceeding after conviction on impeachment). Under British practice, imprisonment
and even execution could be the result upon conviction. The Framers' adoption of a
specific definition of treason in U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, and limitations on its
prosecution and consequences, were significant departures from British practice that
could diminish the relevance of British precedents for impeaching on charges of high
treason.
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Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 2
The British have not had their Constitution frozen as of an
arbitrary moment, but have been able to improve it with
experience. It is thus difficult to see the appeal in a United
States originalist view that would entrench putative British
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century concepts into the United
States Constitution for all time. Rather, my sympathies run
with Charles Black, who wrote in his elegant guide to
impeachment that "the English historical material I have seen
does not seem to stand in the way of our working out, in any
great case in our own times, a sensible concept of the meaning
of 'high Crimes and Misdemeanors,' suitable to the spirit and
structure of our Constitution." 3 Like Professor Black, I would
not put much weight on British precedents for purposes of
United States constitutional interpretation. Still, a few of the
British stories are worth telling here, in a highly abbreviated
(not to say idiosyncratic) review, as illustrations of mistakes to
be avoided rather than models to be emulated.
If British history should be our inspiration for legal control
of executive military misadventures, we could begin with the
case of Admiral John Byng, who was sent in 1756 to relieve the
island of Minorca from a French siege just before the Seven
Years' War was declared. After a lackluster fight, Byng's fleet
retreated and the besieged island fell to the French. Byng was
thereupon found guilty of neglect of duty and executed by firing
squad. 4 The French writer Voltaire gave his character
Candide the chance to witness the spectacle of the execution,
just as Candide was about to disembark at Portsmouth,
England:

12. 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The example of such
unlimited executive power that must have most impressed the forefathers was the
prerogative exercised by George III, and the description of its evils in the Declaration
of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating their new Executive in his
image."). The evidence is clear that the Framers repudiated the substantive
conceptions of executive authority exerted under royal prerogative. See generally
Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
12-17 (1993) (discussing revolutionary nature of the Constitution in terms of the
powers assigned to Congress, the active role contemplated for Congress, and the
disclaiming of the Crown as a model for the Presidency).
13. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 50 (1974).
14. See 2 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPEDIA 693 (15th ed. 1998)
(citing BRIAN TUNSTALL, ADMIRAL BYNG AND THE LOSS OF MINORCA (1928)).
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[Candide] inquired who the stout gentleman was that
was killed with so much ceremony. "He is an admiral," they
replied. "And why was this admiral killed?" "Because," said
they, "he did not kill enough men himself. He attacked the
French admiral, and was found guilty of not being near
enough to him." "But then," said Candide, "was not the
French admiral as far off from the English admiral, as he
was from him?" "That is beyond doubt," they replied. "But
in this country it is good to kill an admiral from time to
time, pour encourager les autres (to encourage the others)." 5
Candide was so shocked by what he had seen and heard that
he declined even to set foot on English soil, and we too can
recoil in horror from such a precedent.
Next to death by firing squad for a military mistake,
impeachment represents a more civilized form of legal control. 6
The impeachment case uppermost in the Framers' minds was
that of Warren Hastings. Indeed, George Mason mentioned the
then-pending Hastings matter at the Philadelphia Convention
while introducing an amendment to expand the category of
impeachable offenses beyond treason and bribery with the
explanation that "Hastings is not guilty of Treason."'
Hastings, the first British governor-general of Bengal, had
been impeached in 1786 in the House of Commons in a process
introduced by Edmund Burke, on allegations concerning the
8
forcible subjugation and corrupt governance of the province.'
His trial before the House of Lords had not yet been held at the
time of the Philadelphia Convention but would in due course
stretch from 1788 to 1795, when he was acquitted. 9

15. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE ch. 23 (1759) (translation adapted from VOLTAIRE,
COLLECTED ROMANCES (1927) and BARTLETr's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (14th ed.

1968)). A different version of this story circulates in the 1990s. On a congressional
inspection tour of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the dangerous days following deployment of
the NATO Implementation Force, the military escort quipped that nothing would
improve the morale of the United States troops more than if a Senator's vehicle hit a
landmine.
16. Under British practice, however, one possible outcome of impeachment was
execution. See supra note 11.
17. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 5, at 605.
18. See THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, Warren Hastings, in 2 CRITICAL,
HISTORICAL, AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS AND POEMS 554, 554-657 (originally
published in 1841 as a review of Hastings's collected papers); see also P.J. MARSHALL,
THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS (1965).

19. Macaulay later wrote that a proper trial should have taken no more than
three months, but "[tlo expect that their Lordships would give up partridge-shooting,
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The Hastings impeachment was, at bottom, a policy
dispute over the conduct and funding of British imperial rule in
India, including the uses and abuses of military power.
Burke's most serious accusation had to do with Hastings's
decision to lend the army at his disposal to an Indian potentate
for essentially mercenary purposes (in exchange for substantial
compensation remitted back to London) in what was known as
the Rohilla War. The House of Commons actually voted down
the Rohilla War article of impeachment by a vote of 119 to 67
but sustained a number of other articles involving corruption,
spoliation, and cruelty.2"
Burke, as head manager of the
impeachment before the Lords, "proceeded to arraign the
administration of Hastings as systematically conducted in
defiance of morality and public law."2 1
In United States legal scholarship of the current period,
the Hastings impeachment has been invoked to support the
interpretation of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" that
emerged as the dominant position at the time of the Nixon
impeachment hearings: "[a] showing of criminality is neither
necessary nor sufficient for the specification of an impeachable
offense."2 2 As Laurence Tribe has written,
With respect to the question of criminality, then, Edmund
Burke's opening statement at the impeachment trial of
Warren Hastings remains definitive: "It is by this tribunal
that statesmen who abuse their power.., are tried... not
upon the niceties of a narrow [criminal] jurisprudence,
but
23
upon the enlarged and solid principles of morality."
"Morality" in this conception ought to mean fundamental abuse
of state power, 24 not merely a disagreement between

in order to bring the greatest delinquent to speedy justice, or to relieve accused
innocence by speedy acquittal, would be unreasonable indeed." MACAULAY, supra
note 18, at 648.
20. See id. at 635-40; MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 44-46. Without defending
the Rohilla policy as such, the government minister responsible for India pointed out
that Parliament, with full knowledge, had not blocked Hastings's reappointment as
governor-general after the Rohilla War. See id. at 45-46.
21. MACAULAY, supra note 18, at 645.
22. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 293-94 (2d ed. 1988)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted).
23. Id. at 294 (quoting 7 E. BURKE, WORKS 11, 14 (1839)) (alteration in
original).
24. Cf BLACK, supra note 13, at 37 (interpreting "high Crimes and
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parliamentarians and executive officers over foreign policy (and
still less the private peccadilloes of an officeholder).
Foreshadowing an argument to be made more than two
centuries later on President Clinton's behalf,25 supporters of
Hastings contended that the dissolution of Parliament after the
commencement of the impeachment but before completion of
the trial was fatal to the entire proceeding.
The legal
argument failed,26 as did a motion in the House of Commons to
drop the whole matter, but a number of the articles of
impeachment were withdrawn to expedite the trial. In Thomas
Macaulay's wry observation, "In truth, had not some such
measure been adopted, the trial would have lasted till the
defendant was in his grave.... As Hastings himself said, the
arraignment had taken place before one generation, and the
judgment was pronounced by another."2 7 In view of Hastings's
belated vindication by the Lords' failure to convict, the
impeachment and trial hardly fulfilled their lofty goals-not
the least of which was to ensure lawfulness of imperial policy
(through ad hoc and post hoc enforcement, to be sure)-but
rather may have worked a serious injustice.
B.

Impeachment and ForeignRelations in the Founding
Texts

In between Hastings's impeachment in the House of
Commons and his trial in the House of Lords, the Framers
concluded their work at the Philadelphia Convention. In
addition to the above-noted references to the Convention's
deliberations, we know that the Framers were mindful, in their
consideration of impeachment, of other recent events in foreign

Misdemeanors" as ejusdem generis with treason and bribery in the sense that all are
offenses "(1) which are extremely serious, (2) which in some way corrupt or subvert
the political and governmental process, and (3) which are plainly wrong in
themselves to a person of honor, or to a good citizen, regardless of words on the
statute books").
25. See Hearing on Impeachment Inquiry Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (Dec. 8, 1998), available in 1998 WL 18089984.
26. This decision (taken contrary to the views of the majority of lawyers in the
House of Commons) has been called the trial's "most important contribution to the
constitutional development of impeachments." MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 75. The
issue had already generated some inconsistent practice in the seventeenth century.
See id. at 75-76.
27.

MACAULAY, supra note 18, at 649.
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affairs-not only involving Britain, but also her adversaries
and allies. For example, Benjamin Franklin discussed the case
of the Prince of Orange, which took place during the fourth
Anglo-Dutch war (1780-1784):
An agreement was made between France & Holland; by
which their two fleets were to unite at a certain time &
place. The Dutch fleet did not appear. Every body began to
wonder at it. At length it was suspected that the Statholder
[the Dutch Prince] was at the bottom of the matter. This
suspicion prevailed more & more. Yet as he could not be
impeached and no regular examination took place, he
remained in his office, and strengthening his own party, as
the party opposed to him became formidable, he gave birth
to the most violent animosities & contentions. Had he been
impeachable, a regular & peacable enquiry would have
taken place and he would if guilty have been duly punished,
if innocent restored to the confidence of the public.
Mr. KING remarked that the case of the Statholder was
not applicable. He held his place for life, and was not
periodically elected. In the former case impeachments are
proper to secure good behaviour. In the latter they are
unnecessary; the periodical responsibility to the 'electors
being an equivalent security.28
In any event, it seems clear that the Framers were
determined to ensure that impeachment would be available as
an ultimate safeguard to remove a chief executive who might
"betray his trust to foreign powers " " or "abus[e] his power;
particularly in time of war.""° The civil remedy of removal from
office would be a desirable safety valve, an alternative to
removal through assassination or insurrection.

28. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 5, at 334.
29. Id. at 332.
30. Id. at 334. The deliberate decision to define treason more restrictively than
in the British practice, see supra note 11, may clarify the significance of these
examples in relation to foreign powers. In FederalistNo. 43, Madison explains that
'as new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent
factions, the natural offspring of free government, have usually wreaked their
alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with great judgment,
opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger" through the constitutional definition and
restrictions on prosecutions for treason. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 273 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
31. See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 5, at 332.
Docr. FRANKLIN was for retaining the [impeachment] clause as
favorable to the Executive .... What was the practice before this in cases
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At the same time, the Framers' treatment of impeachment
also reflected their nuanced compromises on more general
problems of legislative-executive relations. The knotty matters
of mode of selection, term of office, eligibility for reelection, and
removal through impeachment were considered to be entangled
not only with each other, but also with the specification of the
powers of the Chief Executive in relation to Congress, the
states, and the people.3 2 Clearly, the Framers created a
presidency that would not be subservient to the legislative
branch,33 but that could ultimately be held accountable under
the rubric of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" for serious
subversion of the checks and balances of the constitutional
system.

where the chief Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse
was had to assassination in wch. he was not only deprived of his life but
of the opportunity of vindicating his character. It wd. be the best way
therefore to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment of
the Executive where his misconduct should deserve it, and for his
honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly accused.
Id. (footnote omitted).
The Executive will have great opportunitys of abusing his power;
particularly in time of war when the military force, and in some respects
the public money will be in his hands. Should no regular punishment be
provided, it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults & insurrections. He
is aware of the necessity of proceeding with a cautious hand, and of
excluding as much as possible the influence of the Legislature from the
business.
Id. at 334 (statement of Mr. Randolph).
Compare the shift in position of Gouverneur Morris, who originally argued that
the chief magistrate should not be impeachable but that his key subordinates should
be:
As to the danger from an unimpeachable magistrate he could not regard
it as formidable. There must be certain great officers of State; a minister
of finance, or war, of foreign affairs &c. These he presumes will exercise
their functions in subordination to the Executive, and will be amenable
by impeachment to the public Justice.
Id. at 324; see also id. at 331. Later Morris came around to the view that the Chief
Executive should be impeachable if his term of office were to be of significant length.
See id. at 335.
32. Cf. id. at 335 (stating that near the conclusion of debate on impeachment,
"Mr. PINKNEY apprehended that some gentlemen reasoned on a supposition that
the Executive was to have powers which would not be committed to him: He
presumed that his powers would be so circumscribed as to render impeachments
unnecessary").
33. See id. at 605 (refuting a proposal to expand the circumstances for
impeachment to a degree that would be "equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of
the Senate"). On the Framers' conception of impeachment, see generally JOHN R.
LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 1-25 (1978).
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In the ratification efforts, the impeachment provisions
drew attention to points relevant to foreign affairs issues. As
one of two numbers of the FederalistPapers devoted in whole
or substantial part to impeachment,3 4 Federalist No. 66 deals
with the Senate's role in the trial of impeachments and in the
treaty power in the same breath. Responding to objections that
the Senate would be an improper body to try impeachments by
virtue of its union with the Executive in the treaty process,
Publius (Alexander Hamilton) explained that the "JOINT
AGENCY of the Chief Magistrate of the Union, and of two-thirds
of the members of [the Senate], is designed to be the pledge for
the fidelity of the national councils"35 in respect of treaties:
The convention might with propriety have meditated the
punishment of the Executive, for a deviation from the
instructions of the Senate, or a want of integrity in the
conduct of the negotiations committed to him; they might
also have had in view the punishment of a few leading
individuals in the Senate who should have prostituted their
influence in that body as the mercenary instruments of
foreign corruption ....36

The error in the objection to conferring the power to convict on
impeachment in the same two-thirds of the Senate that would
approve a treaty, however, was exposed as follows:
The truth is that in all such cases it is essential to the
freedom and to the necessary independence of the
deliberations of the body that the members of it should be
exempt from punishment for acts done in a collective
capacity; and the security to the society must depend on the
care which is taken to confide the trust to proper hands, to
make it their interest to execute it with fidelity, and to
make it as difficult as possible for them to
37 combine in any
interest opposite to that of the public good.

34. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 65, 66 (Alexander Hamilton). For other briefer
mentions of presidential impeachment, see, for example, id. Nos. 69, 77. Separate
numbers deal with impeachment of judges and other matters unrelated to the
present inquiry.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
36. Id.
37.

Id.
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According to this conception, impeachment would have no place
against a president who acted in conformity with the Senate's
advice in the making of a treaty.38 Perhaps more important,
the primary safeguard against improper treaties is the prior
involvement of an arm of legislature in the treaty process, not
impeachment after the fact.3 9 Impeachment in the treaty
context would be reserved for derelictions subversive of that
safeguard.
The constitutional provisions on presidential impeachment
lay dormant for three-quarters of a century until they were
activated in Congress's struggle with President Andrew
Johnson, the topic to which we now turn. °
II.

ANDREW JOHNSON'S TRIAL AS SEEN FROM ACROSS THE
ATLANTIC

It is not too much of a stretch to think of the impeachment
of President Andrew Johnson in foreign affairs terms. The
impeachment was precipitated, after all, by Johnson's
determination to fire Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton;
Congress and the President were bent on fundamentally
irreconcilable policies toward conquered territory (albeit in a

38. See id. ("So far as might concern the misbehavior of the executive in
perverting the instructions, or contravening the views of the Senate, we need not be
apprehensive of a want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse of their
confidence, or to vindicate their own authority.").
39. Federalist No. 66, in its references to the Senate's "instructions" to the
President, appears to assume a more activist "advice" role for the Senate in the
treaty-making process than has developed in practice. The underlying philosophythat a legislative organ should share as a full partner in decisions for major external
commitments-remains valid today, even though senatorial involvement in treaties
has for more than two centuries centered on the "consent" rather than "advice"
function.
40. Meanwhile, an episode often cited by specialists on legislative-executive
war powers, but virtually ignored in the debates of 1998 to 1999 on censure as a
potential alternative to impeachment, was the adoption by the House of
Representatives in 1848 of an amendment characterizing the Mexican-American War
as "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United
States." CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1848). Scholarship that refers to
this gesture as a "censure" includes EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE
AND POWERS 451 n.7 (4th rev. ed. 1957) and JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 96
(1993), among others. As a one-House action, the 1848 measure lacks the formality
of the censure of President Andrew Jackson that has been frequently mentioned as a
potential precedent for congressional action concerning President Clinton.
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civil rather than external war).41 My objective in this section,
however, is not so much to expound United States foreign
relations law as to illuminate United States separation-ofpowers problems in a comparative context, with reference to
the contrasting British model of parliamentary governance.
For vividness in drawing Anglo-American comparisons, I turn
to Walter Bagehot's The English Constitution, which was
published at the end of our Civil War and is rich in
comparative insights.42
Through the lens of Bagehot's comparative observations
formulated during the United States crisis of 1865 to 1868, we
can better appreciate alternative models of parliamentary
control over executive conduct of foreign affairs. It is perhaps
best to understand him as having sketched archetypes rather
than strictly accurate portrayals of either our system or his
own as both were undergoing considerable change even as he
wrote.43
For Bagehot, the American Civil War and its aftermath
perfectly illustrated the defects of the American system of
governance by comparison to the English system:
Hobbes told us long ago, and everybody now
understands, that there must be a supreme authority, a
conclusive power, in every State on every point
somewhere....
But the division of the sovereign authority in the
American Constitution is far more complex than this....
...[The American Constitution makers] shrank from
placing sovereign power anywhere. They feared that it
would generate tyranny; George III had been a tyrant to

41. Compare the frequent reliance on Civil War precedents, see, e.g., The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862), as authority for interpreting presidential powers
over foreign affairs and military activities.
42. WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION (1964) (initially written as
a series of magazine articles from 1865 to 1866, republished in book form in 1867,
and reissued with a new introduction in 1872). For United States-British
comparisons, see, for example, id. at 59-61, 66, 69-81, 98-99, and infra notes 44-56
and accompanying text.
43. See R.H.S. Crossman, Introduction to BAGEHOT, supra note 42, at 33-35
(discussing criticisms of Bagehot's descriptions of both the United States and the
English systems).
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them, and come what might, they would not make a George
III ....
The result is seen now. At the critical moment of their
history there is no ready, deciding power.... The greatest
moral duty ever set before a Government, and the most
fearful political problem ever set before a Government, are
now set before the American. But there is no decision, and
no possibility of a decision. The President wants one course,
and has the power to prevent any other; the Congress wants
another course, and has power to prevent any other. The
splitting of sovereignty into many parts amounts to there
being no sovereign.
The English Constitution, in a word, is framed on the
principle of choosing a single sovereign authority, and
making it good; the American, upon the principle of having
many sovereign authorities, and hoping that their
multitude may atone for their inferiority.2
If it were not for the American people's "genius for politics" and
inherent excellence, Bagehot concluded, the "multiplicity of
authorities in the American Constitution would long ago have
brought it to a bad end."45
Bagehot additionally believed that the American Framers
had labored under an understandable but significant
misconception about British constitutional developments in the
late eighteenth century.
Because they held George III
responsible for their miseries, they devised a constitution that
would supposedly restrain tyrannical tendencies.4 6 What they

44. BAGEHOT, supra note 42, at 214-20.

The same passage contains the

following:
[T]he Congress declares war, but they would find it very difficult,
according to the recent construction of their laws, to compel the
President to make a peace. The authors of the Constitution doubtless
intended that Congress should be able to control the American executive
as our Parliament controls ours .... But the fact remains that the
President has now, by precedent and decision, a mighty power to
continue a war without the consent of Congress, and perhaps against its

wish.
Id. at 217-18. In a footnote to the paragraph on the impossibility of settling policy
toward the conquered South, he added when the original essays were republished in

book form: "This was written just after the close of the Civil War, but I do not know
that the great problem stated in it has as yet been adequately solved." IM.at 219 n.1.
45. Id. at 220-21.
46.

See id. at 99.

Living across the Atlantic, and misled by accepted doctrines, the acute
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did not realize was that the British royal prerogative was
already ebbing in favor of the "efficient secret" of a new form of
government in which the monarch retained essentially
ceremonial powers and real power lay in the hands of a cabinet
drawn from the Parliament. av
Bagehot found special virtues in cabinet government
where war and foreign affairs powers were concerned:
Under a Cabinet Constitution at a sudden emergency this
people can choose a ruler for the occasion. It is quite
possible and even likely that he would not be ruler before
the occasion. The great qualities, the imperious will, the
rapid energy, the eager nature fit for a great crisis are not
required-are impediments-in common times.... By the
structure of the world we often want, at the sudden
occurrence of a grave tempest, to change the helmsman-to
replace the pilot of the calm by the pilot of the storm. In
England we have had so few catastrophes since our
Constitution attained maturity, that we hardly appreciate
this latent excellence.... But even in England, at what was
the nearest to a great sudden crisis which we have had of
late years-at the Crimean difficulty-we used this
inherent power. We abolished the Aberdeen Cabinet, the
ablest we have had, perhaps, since the Reform Act--a

Framers of the Federal Constitution, even after the keenest attention,
did not perceive the Prime Minister to be the principal executive of the
British Constitution, and the sovereign a cog in the mechanism. There
is, indeed, much excuse for the American legislators in the history of that

time. They took their idea of our Constitution from the time when they
encountered it. But in the so-called Government of Lord North, George
III was the Government. Lord North was not only his appointee, but his
agent. The Minister carried on a war which he disapproved and hated,
because it was a war which his sovereign approved and liked.
Inevitably, therefore, the American Convention believed the King, from
whom they suffered, to be the real executive, and not the Minister, from

whom they had not suffered.
Id.
47. See id. at 65.

The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as
the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and
legislative powers. No doubt by the traditional theory, as it exists in all
the books, the goodness of our constitution consists in the entire
separation of the legislative and executive authorities, but in truth its
merit consists in their singular approximation. The connecting link is
the Cabinet. By that new word we mean a committee of the legislative

body selected to be the executive body.
Id. at 65-66.
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Cabinet not only adapted, but eminently adapted, for every
sort of difficulty save the one it had to meet-which
abounded in pacific discretion48.... "We turned out the
Quaker, and put in the pugilist."
Presumably, today's adaptation of Bagehot's epigram would
depend on exactly who might replace our Commander in Chief:
"We turned out the philanderer, and put in the philosopher,"
or: "We turned out the philanderer, and put in the phony."4 9
To Bagehot, the feud between Congress and President
Andrew Johnson culminating in the impeachment proceedings
showed "the characteristic evils of the Presidential system...
most conspicuously:" °
Nothing could be so conclusive against the American
Constitution, as a Constitution, as that incident. A hostile
legislature and a hostile executive were so tied together,
that the legislature tried, and tried in vain, to rid itself of
the executive by accusing it of illegal practices. The
legislature was so afraid of the President's legal power that
it unfairly accused him of acting beyond the law.5
By contrast, in a parliamentary system, either the Executive
would yield or be displaced, or dissolution of the Parliament
would produce a new mandate from the people.
Before leaving Bagehot's critique of the Johnson
impeachment, it may be worth mentioning that, even for a
parliamentary system, he perceived a residual role for
impeachment in matters concerning royal prerogatives in the
foreign affairs sphere. Indeed, those prerogatives might be
sweeping:

48. Id. at 78-79. By contrast, "under a Presidential government you can do
nothing of the kind. The American Government calls itself a Government of the
supreme people; but at a quick crisis, the time when a sovereign power is most
needed, you cannot find the supreme people." Id. at 79.
49. The phrases in the text were formulated for their fricatives and not for the
phenomenon of vice-presidential succession. If the Clinton impeachment trial had
occupied the country through the November 2000 election, the successor president
could have emerged from a phalanx of phrenetics.
50. BAGEHOT, supra note 42, at 300 (from the Introduction to the 1872 edition,
reprinted as an appendix in the 1964 republication).
51. Id. at 301.
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Not to mention other 'things, [the Queen] could disband the
army (by law she cannot engage more than a certain
number of men, but she is not obliged to engage any men);
she could dismiss all the officers, from the General
Commanding-in-Chief downwards; she could dismiss all the
sailors too; she could sell off all our ships of war and all our
naval stores; she could make a peace by the sacrifice of
Cornwall, and begin a war for the conquest of Brittany....
In a word, the Queen could by prerogative.., disgrace the
nation by a bad war or peace, and could, by disbanding our
forces, whether land or sea, leave us defenceless against
foreign nations.5 2
But Bagehot claimed that the British realm need not fear such
abuses of the royal prerogative because of the twofold checks of
impeachment and changes of ministry. For ordinary errors of
judgment made in good faith, the remedy would be a change of
ministry," while the check of impeachment on charges of high
treason would remain available only against a minister "who
advised the Queen so to use her prerogative as to endanger the
safety of the realm."5 4 It is perhaps superfluous to note that
the British Parliament has not turned to this drastic recourse
since Bagehot wrote. Indeed, the last impeachment in Britain
was in 1806:*"
Bagehot himself acknowledged that the British model
could benefit from adapting certain features found in the
American system, including prior parliamentary involvement
in decisions on treaties.56 And, as will be seen below, certain
modern influential figures in the United States have urged
serious consideration of importing aspects of the British
system, especially in order to improve on dysfunctional aspects

52. Id. at 287.
53. See id. at 288.
54. Id. at 287.
55. See 6 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPEDA 271 (15th ed. 1998).
56. See BAGEHOT, supra note 42, at 288-96. Though alluding to American
sources on the treaty power, including Benjamin Franklin, Bagehot did not
recommend a wholesale copying of the American Senate's advice-and-consent role.
Rather, his proposal-laying the treaty on the table in both Houses of Parliament
and deeming it approved unless objection were raised within a fixed number dayseventually took hold under the practice known, since 1924, as the "Ponsonby nile."
See Lord Sydney Templeman, Treaty-Making and the British Parliament, in
PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE MAKING AND OPERATION OF TREATIES: A

COMPARATIvE STUDY 153, 158-59, 175 n.ll (Stefan A- Riesenfeld & Frederick M.

Abbott eds., 1994).
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of our foreign policy process. This essay returns to those
arguments after taking up aspects of the Watergate crisis and
the Iran-Contra affair relevant to whether presidential
decisions on war and external affairs can give rise to
impeachable offenses.

III.

IMPEACHABILITY OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS: WATERGATE AND BEYOND

A. War Powers in the Watergate Crisis
The Watergate crisis of the Nixon presidency was
inextricably tied to the Indochina conflict. Of the articles of
impeachment approved by the House Judiciary Committee in
July 1974, several provisions concerned abuse of presidential
power or misuse of executive agencies to suppress antiwar
dissent." Two articles charged misuse and unlawful use of the
Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") in order to obstruct justice
and to prejudice constitutional rights,58 contrary to the CIA
statute, which gives that agency national security functions
and prohibits it from engaging in internal political or law
enforcement activities.59
The article of impeachment
concerning abuse of power specified not only unlawful
electronic surveillance of private citizens, but also breaking
and entering the offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding (the psychiatrist
to Daniel Ellsberg, who had provided the Pentagon Papers to
the New York Times and the Washington Post).6" Each of these
activities formed part of Nixon's long-running effort to discredit
antiwar activists.
"National security" (real or spurious) formed part of the
asserted legal justification for withholding the subpoenaed
Oval Office tapes. Specifically, Nixon had interposed various
claims tantamount to an invocation of a national security

57. See generally IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305 (1974) [hereinafter H.R. REP. ON NIXON

IMPEACHMENT] (approving, inter alia, Article II, which alleged various abuses
executive agencies, including electronic surveillance for purposes unrelated
national security and other actions in violation of the constitutional rights
citizens).
58. See i& art. I, at 2, art. 11(3), at 157, art. 11(5), at 177.
59. See National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-404f (1994 & Supp.
1996).
60. See H.R. REP. ONNIxON IMPEACHMENT, supra note 57, art. 11(4), at 171.

of
to
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privilege (or to the unfeasibility of segregating state secrets
from unprivileged material) in arguing that separation-ofpowers considerations stood in the way of his being required to
surrender the tapes to a coordinate branch of government. By
the time the matter reached the Supreme Court, however, the
President had refined his claim to one of executive privilege in
receiving confidential advice from his subordinates rather than
one of state secrets privilege. The Supreme Court explicitly
reserved any questions concerning sensitive military,
diplomatic, or national security information in holding that the
President's undifferentiated claim of executive privilege could
not prevail over the bona fide need for the subpoenaed
materials in connection with a criminal proceeding. 6 ' On July
24, 1974, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the tapes
had to be turned over to the district court for inspection in
camera.
The most significant way in which the Watergate crisis
and Nixon's national security practices intersected was in the
weighing of a proposed article of impeachment concerning the
secret bombing of Cambodia. On July 30, 1974, the House
Judiciary Committee considered a draft article asserting that
Nixon had
on and subsequent to March 17, 1969, authorized, ordered,
and ratified the concealment from the Congress of the facts
and the submission to the Congress of false and misleading
statements concerning the existence, scope and nature of
American bombing operations in Cambodia in derogation of
the power of the Congress to declare war, to make
appropriations and to raise and support armies.6 2
By a vote of 26 to 12, the Committee decided not to report this
The
draft article to the full House of Representatives.
Committee took note of the proponents' position that
the President, by issuing false and misleading statements,
failed to provide Congress with complete and accurate
information and thereby prevented Congress from
responsibly exercising its powers to declare war, to raise
and support armies, and to make appropriations. They

61. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
62. H.R. REP. ON NIXON IMPEACHMENT, supra note 57, at 217.
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stated that informing a few selected members of the
Congress about the Cambodian bombing did not constitute
the constitutionally required notice ....The supporters also
stated that Congress had not ratified the President's
conduct through inaction or by its 1973 limitation on
bombing because Congress did not know of the bombing
until after it voted the authorization.
The principal arguments in opposition to the draft article were
that President Nixon had indeed acted within his
constitutional powers in ordering the bombing, and that
Congress had, in any event, been sufficiently informed and,
64
further, had acquiesced in or even ratified the bombing.
In the months leading up to and following the Nixon
resignation, eminent constitutional scholars embarked upon
the challenge of explaining why a sufficiently egregious
circumvention of constitutional checks and balances could, in
principle, be impeachable even if no criminal law had
technically been violated.
These scholars also examined
whether Congress should have concluded to impeach (or not to
impeach) based on the facts of the Cambodia matter. Charles
Black, writing in May 1974, cogently clarified the issues:
It seems quite possible that military action,
unauthorized by Congress and concealed from Congress,
might at some point constitute such a murderous and
insensate abuse of the commander-in-chief power as to
amount to a "high Crime" or "Misdemeanor" for
impeachment purposes, though not criminal in the ordinary
sense. But... precedents of the distant and recent past
make it hard to establish knowing wrongfulness in most
such cases. And the question, specifically, whether the
long-secret 1973 Cambodian bombing could amount to an
impeachable offense is complicated by the fact that, on its
being revealed, Congress, by postponing until August 15,
1973, the deadline for its ending, would seem to have come

63. Id. at 218. The proponents further contended "that the technicalities or
merits of the war in Southeast Asia, the acquiescence or protests of Prince Sihanouk,
and the arguably similar conduct of past Presidents were irrelevant to the question of
President Nixon's constitutional accountability in usurping Congress' war-making
and appropriations powers." Id.
64. See id. at 219. It was also argued that the dispute over the legality of the

Cambodia bombing was moot by virtue of the. passage of legislation terminating the
bombing as of August 15, 1973, as well as the War Powers Resolution adopted (over
the President's veto) later the same year. See id.
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close to ratifying it. One is sailing very close to the wind
when one says, "You may do it till August 15, but it is an
impeachable offense."t 5
Reluctantly, I have to conclude that only a very extreme
and not now visible case ought to bring the impeachment
weapon into play as a sanction against presidential warlike
Congress ought to deal with this matter
activity.
comprehensively and clearly; if it did, then the president's
violation of the congressional rules would be impeachable
generated by
beyond a doubt, for the uncertainties
66
precedent would be cleared up.

Black's approach has been echoed by other top constitutional
scholars writing in the aftermath of the Watergate crisis and
seeking to distill its lessons.6 7
A few years ago, John Hart Ely comprehensively
reexamined constitutional aspects of the Indochina conflict,
including the relevance of presidential concealment of facts
from Congress and the responsibility of Congress to ferret out
In regard to the legal confusion
information for itself.
concerning what Congress did and did not know, or did and did
not approve about the Cambodia bombing, Ely concludes that
with "tolerably full knowledge of what was going on' s Congress
probably did authorize the bombing from mid-1970 until the

65. BLACK, supra note 13, at 34-35. By contrast, Black presciently found it
"preposterous" that anyone would think of impeaching a president for acts
technically criminal but not amounting to extremely serious abuses of governmental
power. His examples, conceived in 1974, included transporting a woman for
"immoral purposes" or assisting a young White House intern in concealing a minor
crime. Id. at 35-36.
66. Id. at 44. He added:
The so-called War Powers Resolution passed last year is so far from
filling this need that the Administration, not without plausibility, could
publicly toy with the idea that the resolution, supposedly a restraint on
the president, actually authorized resumption of the Cambodian
bombing that Congress had earlier ordered to be ended!
Id. at 44-45.
67. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 22, at 294 ("A deliberate presidential decision to
emasculate our national defenses, or to conduct a private war in circumvention of the
Constitution, would probably violate no criminal code, but it should surely be deemed
a ground of impeachment."). On the rejection of the article of impeachment on
Cambodia, see Louis Pollak, The Constitution as an Experiment, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1318, 1329-39 (1975); cf LABOVITZ, supra note 33, at 123-25 (noting that the
Cambodia article, even though aimed at the deception of Congress rather than the
bombing itself, was not adopted because it would have been unnecessarily divisive).
68. ELY, supra note 40, at 46.
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legislated deadline of August 15, 1973.69 By contrast, Nixon
deliberately misled Congress about the bombing between
March 1969 and April 1970, and continued to conceal the full
truth of those activities until 1973. In an extended discussion
of which aspects of the Indochina course of conduct might have
been properly impeachable, Ely adopts Black's interpretation of
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors" to include a serious and
willful violation of the separation of powers.7 ° On the facts of
the Indochina conflict, Ely concludes that, although
impeachment probably would not have been a plausible remedy
for other problems, including what he calls "the (unenforceable)
unconstitutionality of the 'secret war' in Laos,"71 Congress
ought to have gone forward with impeachment over the
concealment of the Cambodia bombing:
The other thing Congress can do is make damn sure that
on the rare occasion when the facts converge in such a way
as to make impeachment a politically viable option-where
the secret of the war is actually kept from Congress, and
only one president is involved-it does impeach him for
fighting an unjustifiably secret and unauthorized war.
Deterrence can work even at high levels. Of course the facts
will seldom add up that way.
...[With respect to Cambodia], an impeachment inquiry
would have been well designed to unravel alleged executive
motives and determine which among them constituted only
post facto rationalization. Unlike the war in Laos, the
secret bombing of Cambodia was an offense consummated
by one and only one president. Also unlike Laos, it was a
well-kept secret-involving measures as extreme as
hoodwinking the Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff and
providing falsified secret documents to the relevant
congressional committees for up to four years after the
events. The fact that Congress will not be in a moral
position to impeach when it has in effect been part of the

69. See id at 30-46.
70. See id. at 95, 211 n.172 (citing BLACK, supra note 13, at 28, 33-37, 39-40;
BERGER, supra note 7, at 70).
71. Id at 68. Among the reasons precluding impeachment as regards Laos, Ely
notes that various members of Congress knew enough about the Laotian war to put
them on notice for further inquiry, that Congress's main concern once it learned of
the matter was to bar the introduction of ground troops only, and that the Laos policy
had stretched over the Kennedy and Johnson as well as the Nixon Administrations.

See id. at 95-97.
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conspiracy makes it all the more important that it do so in
the rare situation where it wasn't.
I'd have impeached him for it. Surely it would have been
a more worthy ground than the combination of a third-rate
burglary and a style the stylish couldn't stomach. As
Congressman William Hungate put it: "It's kind of hard to
live with yourself when you impeach a guy for tapping
telephones
and
not for
making
war
without
72
authorization."
Today, it ought to be even more difficult for Congress to
impeach a president for lying about sex (telephonic or
otherwise), when other presidents have lied about war without
being held to account.
B. The Iran-ContraAffair
For enlightenment on why impeachment was never
seriously considered over the Iran-Contra affair during the
Reagan presidency, we may turn to two of our more
distinguished former members of Congress: (1) William S.
Cohen (who, as a freshman Republican on the House Judiciary
Committee in 1974, supported and even helped draft the
articles of impeachment against President Nixon, served on the
select Iran-Contra committee in the 1980s, and most recently,
as the Secretary of Defense, had to explain to a skeptical press
corps why there was no "Wag-the-Dog" element in President
Clinton's decision of December 16, 1998 to launch cruise
missiles against Iraq) and (2) George J. Mitchell (former
Senate majority leader and, later, mediator of the Northern
Ireland conflict, a struggle perhaps even bloodier and more
intractable than those between the President and Congress).7 3
With reference to the remark of a Lord Chancellor of England
in the seventeenth century that impeachment was like
"Goliath's sword, to be kept in the temple and not used but on
great occasions," Cohen and Mitchell observe that the Reagan
Administration's "foreign policy mistake did not demand a

72. Id. at 97-104 (footnotes omitted).
73. See WILLIAM S. COHEN& GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MEN OF ZEAL: A CANDID
INSIDE STORY OF THE IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS (1988).
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political beheading," 74 nor was it much like Watergate in its
implications:
The sale of weapons to Iran constituted a foreign-policy
error of major proportions, but did not appear to involve the
President in violation of a criminal statute. There was no
evidence that President Reagan knew about the diversion of
profits from the arms sale to the Contras.... Congressman
Lee Hamilton stated ...that if the President in fact had
knowledge of the diversion, he might have committed an
impeachable act. Hamilton's statement raised an important
issue. Was knowledge of the diversion itself a serious
breach of the President's constitutional responsibilities? Or
would lying about having such knowledge have constituted
an offense that would have warranted removing the
President from office? 75
Congress did not have to face the issue of impeachability over
lying or concealment in the absence of evidence that President
Reagan was aware of the diversion.
Another potential ground for Reagan's impeachment might
have been his circumvention of congressional limitations on
funding for the Contras (the so-called Boland Amendments),
through executive solicitation of foreign governments to
contribute to that cause. Some select committee members
perceived a legal distinction between what the President might
have lawfully done under his own constitutional authority and
what he might have encouraged or condoned on the part of his
subordinates in defiance of statutory restrictions: "The exact
state of the President's knowledge about the fund-raising
activities was never resolved. But even if the Committee had
established that the President had been fully informed, it is
have considered that a 'high
doubtful that Congress would
76
crime and misdemeanor.'
Finally, Congress had to be mindful of its own vacillation
As with Indochina, the
over policy toward the Contras.
inference of congressional acquiescence in questionable
executive activities was at least plausible: "Before Congress
can seriously contemplate filing a resolution of impeachment
for presidential misconduct, it must come forward with clean
74. Id. at 45.
75. Id. at 46-47.
76. Id. at 48.
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hands, if not with a pure heart.""
For all these reasons, the congressional responses to the
Iran-Contra affair stopped well short of the political beheading
that impeachment would have entailed. Instead, a number of
Reagan Administration figures were prosecuted for infractions
of varying degrees of seriousness, including conspiracy to
undermine congressional policies and misleading Congress.7"
CONCLUSION
The above discussion can be restated simply in four
principles: (1) impeachment needs to be reserved for the most
serious assaults on constitutional governance; (2) an egregious
subversion of constitutionally mandated congressional
prerogatives concerning major foreign policy decisions could, in
principle, constitute an impeachable offense; (3) impeachment
is a last resort to safeguard our constitutional system and not a
means for Congress to hold the President accountable for the
ordinary conduct of the office (and still less for personal
behavior); and (4) the essence of our constitutional system
entails a sharing of major foreign policy decisions between the
President and Congress, and not adversarial impeachment
proceedings after mistakes have been made. Judged in these
terms, the current impeachment of President Clinton is
unjustifiable and runs the serious risk of undermining national
security objectives at a time when United States presidential
leadership in global affairs is sorely needed.
If the model of presidential-congressional balance that has
survived more than two centuries founders over the present
crisis, could more radical propositions for constitutional reform
find an audience? On the occasion of the 1987 bicentennial of
the United States Constitution, a blue-ribbon panel charged
with
making
recommendations
for
constitutional
77. Id. at 49 (citing House Judiciary Committee, Debates on Proposed Articles
of Impeachment, July 30, 1974; Debate on Proposed Article on Concealment of
Information About Bombing Operations in Cambodia).
78. Most of the convictions were either reversed by appellate courts or covered
by a pardon later issued by President Bush. For more on the Iran-Contra affair, see
generally HAROLD HON_ u KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITrrION (1990).
The possibility of impeachment crossed the mind of at least one member of
Congress with respect to President Reagan's decision to intervene in Grenada; a
resolution of impeachment was introduced by Representative Ted Weiss but not
acted upon. See H.R. Res. 370, 98th Cong. (1983).
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improvements formulated a number of suggestions for
reforming different aspects of the United States system. Those
recommendations aimed at mitigating some of the dysfunctions
inherent in our brand of divided government, including ones
hindering the conduct of foreign relations, by importing
The
miscellaneous features from parliamentary models.79
proposals, which received modest attention at the time, were
reminiscent of previous studies influenced by British models,
going back to Woodrow Wilson's famous thesis, Congressional
One of the panelists, Senator J. William
Government."°
Fulbright, later wrote that Americans ought to abandon the
"harmful myth... that there is something sacred about the
principle of separation of powers," 8 for the reason, among
others, that our system "leads to indecision and stalemate.
And it is growing inadequate for the formulation of a coherent,
rational foreign policy."8 2
Like Bagehot, who wrote more than a century before,
Fulbright extolled parliamentary governance for the ease of
changing leadership as circumstances require:
Another great weakness of our system is how hard it is to
get rid of an inadequate leader. In a parliamentary system,
if you have a serious problem with an issue of judgment, it
is not such an extraordinary thing.... When Britain's
Middle East policy collapsed at the time of Suez in 1956,
Anthony Eden was out in two weeks, embarrassed but not
disgraced, and the country was enabled to proceed with the
conduct of its business .... In a parliamentary system

79. See
ANALYSIS

COMMITTEE

OF

THE

ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL

AMERICAN

POLITICAL

SYSTEM, A

STRUCTURE:

BICENTENNIAL

REPORT

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITIUTIONAL SYSTEM (1987).

80. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOvERNMENT (1885). As one of
Wilson's biographers points out, "what can probably be said of no other thesis for the
Ph.D.," Wilson's book "was still in print a hundred years later." AUGUST
HECKSCHER, WOODROW WILSON: A BIOGRAPHY 77 (1991).
81. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, THE PRICE OF EMPIRE, at x (1989).
82. Id. at 45; see also id. at 55 ("[W]e have celebrated our system of checks and
balances for so long that we now ignore the ways in which it weakens our
government with a dynamic of adversarial relationships that frustrates any coherent
policy."); id. at 71-73 (stating that our checks and balances cannot cope with
challenges such as large-scale military operations as well as a parliamentary
system).
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Nixon would have been forced to resign early
on and
83
perhaps been packed off to the House of Lords.

By contrast, for some British commentators, the Suez episode
precisely illustrates the flaws of a system lacking effective
checks on prime ministerial power. 4 Indeed, enthusiasts of
importing British parliamentarianism to the United States
should consider that the British parliamentary system
concentrates state power to a degree that could be tolerable
only in the case of a medium or small power but that would be
dangerous to domestic and international security in the hands
of a superpower. 5
It is not my purpose here to argue for transplantation of

pieces of either the United States or the British system to the
other, though I do think there is much to be learned from their
comparative study and from cross-fertilization of constitutional
ideas. The most recent impeachment crisis, counterproductive

as it has been for the nation as a whole, should provoke a new
outpouring of reflections on the enduring problems of
separation of powers, in which comparative constitutional
analysis may be able to contribute some insights. Once in a

generation, at least, we do need to ask ourselves the big
questions.

83. Id. at 66.
84. Thus Crossman wrote that Eden took the Suez decisions without even
consulting his cabinet: "After the secret was revealed, he was able until he fell ill to
enforce collective responsibility on a Cabinet only informed of his policy when it was
already doomed to failure." Crossman, supra note 43, at 55-56. Crossman went on
with a plea for checks and balances: "In theory-but also in practice-the British
people retains the power not merely to choose between two Prime Ministers ... but to
throw off its deferential attitude and reshape the political system ... even insisting
that the House of Commons should once again provide the popular check on the
executive." Id. at 56.
85. As Sir Oliver Wright, former British ambassador to the United States,
commented concerning the "astonishing power to the executive" under British
parliamentary government, "give the executive of a superpower... powers of that
magnitude, and we all should be in trouble." Sir Oliver Wright, The British View,
AM. HERITAGE, May-June 1987, at 92, quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The
Constitutionand PresidentialLeadership,47 MD. L. REV. 54, 59 (1987); see also Leon
D. Epstein, Changing Perceptionsof the British System, 109 POL. SCIENCE Q. 483,
488-98 (1994); Monaghan, supra note 12, at 2 n.8 (citing ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,
JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 464-73 (2d ed. 1989) for the irony that proposals to
adopt parliamentary features in the American system are being pressed even as
English and Canadian reformers seek to make their systems more like the American
one); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Limits of the Parliamentary Critique of the
Separationof Powers, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 721-27 (1993).

